

118TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. _____

To enhance United States cooperation with European countries to improve the security of Taiwan, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. RICKETTS (for himself and Mrs. SHAHEEN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on

A BILL

To enhance United States cooperation with European countries to improve the security of Taiwan, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Building Options for
5 the Lasting Security of Taiwan through European Resolve
6 Act” or the “BOLSTER Act”.

7 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

8 Congress finds the following:

1 (1) In an October 2022 speech before the 20th
2 National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party,
3 General Secretary Xi Jinping declared that the Peo-
4 ple’s Republic of China (referred to in this Act as
5 the “PRC”) has not ruled out the use of force re-
6 garding Taiwan.

7 (2) The Office of the Director of National
8 Intelligence’s Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S.
9 Intelligence Community, published on February 6,
10 2023, noted that “Beijing is working to meet its
11 goal of fielding a military by 2027 designed to deter
12 U.S. intervention in a future cross-Strait crisis.”.

13 (3) The risk of economic disruption following a
14 conflict in the Taiwan Strait could amount to ap-
15 proximately \$2,000,000,000,000 in a blockade sce-
16 nario, which would immediately, and potentially irre-
17 versibly impact global trade and investment, key
18 supply chains for semiconductors, and other trade
19 and national security priorities.

20 (4) The European Union’s foreign and security
21 policy service, the European External Action Service,
22 recognizes that the European Union may use sanc-
23 tions to promote the objectives of its Common For-
24 eign and Security Policy, all of which have potential

1 relevance in the event of military action or coercion
2 against Taiwan.

3 (5) The European Union has imposed sanctions
4 on—

5 (A) PRC officials and entities responsible
6 for human rights abuses in Xinjiang; and

7 (B) PRC entities for their support of Rus-
8 sia’s illegal and unprovoked war in Ukraine.

9 (6) In July 2022, Jorge Toledo Albinana, Am-
10 bassador of the European Union to the People’s Re-
11 public of China, said, “In the event of a military in-
12 vasion [of Taiwan], we have made it very clear that
13 the European Union, with the United States and its
14 allies, will impose similar or even greater measures
15 than those we have now taken against Russia.”.

16 (7) On January 18, 2023, the European Par-
17 liament passed a resolution calling upon “all com-
18 petent European Union institutions to urgently draw
19 up a scenario-based strategy for tackling security
20 challenges in Taiwan.”.

21 (8) In an April 18, 2023, speech to the Euro-
22 pean Parliament, European Commission President
23 Ursula von der Leyen emphasized that the European
24 Union “stand[s] strongly against any unilateral

1 change of the status quo [in the Taiwan Strait], in
2 particular by the use of force.”.

3 (9) The PRC has supported Russia’s illegal,
4 full-scale invasion of Ukraine by resupplying Rus-
5 sia’s defense industrial base.

6 (10) Taiwan has—

7 (A) aligned itself with European Union
8 sanctions against Russia in response to the full-
9 scale invasion of Ukraine; and

10 (B) provided Ukraine more than
11 \$113,000,000 in financial support and more
12 than 950 metric tons of humanitarian supplies.

13 **SEC. 3. CONSULTATIONS, PLANS, REPORTS, AND BRIEF-**
14 **INGS.**

15 (a) CONSULTATIONS WITH EUROPEAN GOVERN-
16 MENTS REGARDING SANCTIONS AGAINST THE PRC
17 UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.—

18 (1) IN GENERAL.—The head of the Office of
19 Sanctions Coordination at the Department of State,
20 in consultation with the Director of the Office of
21 Foreign Assets Control at the Department of the
22 Treasury, shall engage in regular consultations with
23 the International Special Envoy for the Implementa-
24 tion of European Union Sanctions and appropriate
25 government officials of European countries, includ-

1 ing the United Kingdom, to develop coordinated
2 plans and share information on independent plans to
3 impose sanctions and other economic measures
4 against the PRC, as appropriate, if the PRC is
5 found to be involved in—

6 (A) overthrowing or dismantling the gov-
7 erning institutions in Taiwan, including engag-
8 ing in disinformation campaigns in Taiwan that
9 promote the strategic interests of the PRC;

10 (B) occupying any territory controlled or
11 administered by Taiwan as of the date of the
12 enactment of this Act;

13 (C) violating the territorial integrity of
14 Taiwan;

15 (D) taking significant action against Tai-
16 wan, including—

17 (i) creating a naval blockade or other
18 quarantine of Taiwan;

19 (ii) seizing the outer lying islands of
20 Taiwan; or

21 (iii) initiating a cyberattack that
22 threatens civilian or military infrastructure
23 in Taiwan; or

24 (E) providing assistance that helps the se-
25 curity forces of the Russian Federation in exe-

1 cutting Russia’s unprovoked, illegal war against
2 Ukraine.

3 (2) SEMIANNUAL CONGRESSIONAL BRIEF-
4 INGS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the
5 enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter
6 for the following 5 years, the head of the Office of
7 Sanctions Coordination shall provide a briefing re-
8 garding the progress of the consultations required
9 under paragraph (1) to—

10 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
11 the Senate;

12 (B) the Committee on Banking, Housing,
13 and Urban Affairs of the Senate;

14 (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
15 the House of Representatives; and

16 (D) the Committee on Financial Services
17 of the House of Representatives.

18 (b) COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT IN
19 A TAIWAN CONTINGENCY.—

20 (1) PLAN.—Not later than 1 year after the date
21 of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of
22 the United States Agency for International Develop-
23 ment (referred to in this section as the “Adminis-
24 trator”), in coordination with the Secretary of State,
25 shall develop a plan to deliver humanitarian aid to

1 Taiwan in the event of a blockade, quarantine, or
2 military invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Libera-
3 tion Army (referred to in this Act as the “PLA”).

4 (2) CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT.—In devel-
5 oping the plan required under paragraph (1), the
6 Administrator shall consult with the European Com-
7 mission’s Emergency Response Coordination Centre
8 and appropriate government officials of European
9 countries regarding cooperation to provide aid to
10 Indo-Pacific countries as the result of a blockade,
11 quarantine, or military invasion of Taiwan by the
12 PLA, including the extent to which European coun-
13 tries could backfill United States humanitarian aid
14 to other parts of the world.

15 (3) CONGRESSIONAL ENGAGEMENT.—Upon
16 completion of the plan required under paragraph
17 (1), the Administrator shall provide a briefing re-
18 garding the details of such plan and the consulta-
19 tions required under paragraph (2) to the Com-
20 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
21 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
22 resentatives.

23 (c) REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF PRC
24 MILITARY ACTION AGAINST TAIWAN.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after
2 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
3 shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign
4 Relations of the Senate and the Committee on For-
5 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives that
6 contains an independent assessment of the expected
7 economic impact of—

8 (A) a 30-day blockade or quarantine of
9 Taiwan by the PLA; and

10 (B) a 180-day blockade or quarantine of
11 Taiwan by the PLA.

12 (2) ASSESSMENT ELEMENTS.—The assessment
13 required under paragraph (1) shall contain a de-
14 scription of—

15 (A) the impact of the blockade or quar-
16 antine of Taiwan on global trade and output;

17 (B) the 10 economic sectors that would be
18 most disrupted by a sustained blockade of Tai-
19 wan by the PLA; and

20 (C) the expected economic impact of a sus-
21 tained blockade of Taiwan by the PLA on the
22 domestic economies of European countries that
23 are members of NATO or the European Union.

24 (3) INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT.—

1 (A) IN GENERAL.—The assessment re-
2 quired under paragraph (1) shall be conducted
3 by a federally-funded research and development
4 center or another appropriate independent enti-
5 ty with expertise in economic analysis.

6 (B) USE OF DATA FROM PREVIOUS STUD-
7 IES.—The entity conducting the assessment re-
8 quired under paragraph (1) may use and incor-
9 porate information contained in previous stud-
10 ies on matters relevant to the elements of the
11 assessment.

12 **SEC. 4. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION AND**
13 **EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS REGARDING IN-**
14 **CREASING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELA-**
15 **TIONS WITH TAIWAN.**

16 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

17 (1) Representative offices in Taiwan have been
18 established by—

19 (A) 16 of the 27 European Union member
20 states;

21 (B) the European Union;

22 (C) the United Kingdom; and

23 (D) Switzerland.

24 (2) Taiwan has representative offices in—

1 (A) 19 of the 27 European Union coun-
2 tries;

3 (B) the United Kingdom; and

4 (C) Switzerland.

5 (3) The PRC has used its economic power to
6 pressure Taiwan's diplomatic allies to cut ties and
7 switch diplomatic recognition to the PRC, which has
8 reduced Taiwan's diplomatic allies to just 12, includ-
9 ing The Holy See.

10 (4) On November 18, 2021, Taiwan formally
11 opened the Taiwanese Representative Office in Lith-
12 uania, which is the first such office in Europe that
13 uses Taiwan in its title rather than the PRC-pre-
14 ferred title, "Taipei", despite actions of economic co-
15 ercion imposed on Lithuania by the PRC.

16 (5) Since 2020, legislative bodies in Poland,
17 Lithuania, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the
18 Czech Republic, Italy, Switzerland, Ireland, Bel-
19 gium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark, and Slovakia
20 have passed legislation or resolutions that call for—

21 (A) deepening ties and exchanges with Tai-
22 wan;

23 (B) supporting Taiwan's participation in
24 international organizations; or

1 (C) maintaining the status quo in the Tai-
2 wan Strait.

3 (6) Since 2020, parliamentary delegations from
4 Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Lithuania,
5 Germany, Spain, France, Finland, Romania, Por-
6 tugal, Belgium, Sweden, Ireland, Italy, Estonia, Lat-
7 via, and the European Union have visited Taiwan.

8 (7) In May 2023, representatives from the
9 United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Czech
10 Republic joined the United States, Australia, and
11 Japan in a joint statement calling for Taiwan's in-
12 clusion in the 76th World Health Assembly.

13 (8) The November 2023 Group of 7 Japan
14 2023 Foreign Ministers' Statement expressed "sup-
15 port for Taiwan's meaningful participation in inter-
16 national organizations, including in the World
17 Health Assembly and WHO technical meetings."

18 (9) As of 2022, Taiwan was the European
19 Union's 13th largest trading partner overall and its
20 5th largest Asian trading partner.

21 (10) Taiwan is a leading investor in the Czech
22 Republic, which currently hosts more than
23 \$1,000,000,000 in foreign direct investment from
24 Taiwan, resulting in thousands of jobs for Czech
25 citizens.

1 (11) From 2021 to 2022, trade between Lith-
2 uania and Taiwan increased by 50 percent. Taiwan
3 has invested in Lithuania’s emerging chip sector,
4 laser companies, and other high-tech industries.

5 (12) In June 2022, the European Commission,
6 for the first time, upgraded its trade and investment
7 dialogues with Taiwan, which had been ongoing at
8 the technical level for more than 20 years, to the
9 ministerial and director-general level for the first
10 time in recognition of the benefit from higher-level
11 coordination.

12 (13) In August 2023, Taiwan Semiconductor
13 Manufacturing Company Limited announced part-
14 nerships with various European technology firms
15 and investments of \$3,500,000,000 to build its first
16 semiconductor plant in Europe in Germany.

17 (14) On November 8, 2023, the Government of
18 the United Kingdom signed an Enhanced Trade
19 Partnership agreement with Taiwan. This is the
20 first such agreement between Taiwan and a Euro-
21 pean country.

22 (15) On December 13, 2023 the European Par-
23 liament passed a resolution that—

1 (A) urges the European Union to pursue a
2 resilient supply chain agreement with Taiwan;
3 and

4 (B) calls for a bilateral investment agree-
5 ment between Taiwan and the European Union
6 to enhance a 2-way partnership in digital trade
7 and cyber resilience.

8 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
9 gress that—

10 (1) the United States, Europe, and Taiwan are
11 like-minded partners that—

12 (A) share common values, such as democ-
13 racy, the rule of law and human rights; and

14 (B) enjoy a close trade and economic part-
15 nership;

16 (2) bolstering political, economic, and people-to-
17 people relations with Taiwan would benefit the Eu-
18 ropean Union, individual European countries, and
19 the United States;

20 (3) the European Union can play an important
21 role in helping Taiwan resist the economic coercion
22 of the PRC by negotiating with Taiwan regarding
23 new economic, commercial, and investment agree-
24 ments;

1 (4) the United States and European countries
2 should coordinate and increase diplomatic efforts to
3 facilitate Taiwan’s meaningful participation in inter-
4 national organizations;

5 (5) the United States and European countries
6 should—

7 (A) publicly and repeatedly emphasize the
8 differences between their respective “One
9 China” policies and the PRC’s “One China”
10 principle; and

11 (B) counter the PRC’s propaganda and
12 false narratives about United Nations General
13 Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI), which claim
14 the resolution recognizes PRC territorial claims
15 to Taiwan; and

16 (6) Taiwan’s inclusion in the U.S.-EU Trade
17 and Technology Council’s Secure Supply Chain
18 working group would bring valuable expertise and
19 enhance transatlantic cooperation in the semicon-
20 ductor sector.

21 (c) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING.—Not later than 180
22 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and semi-
23 annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary
24 of State shall provide a briefing to the Committee on For-
25 eign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on For-

1 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives regarding the
2 Department of State's engagements with the European
3 Union and the governments of European countries to in-
4 crease political and economic relations with Taiwan, in-
5 cluding—

6 (1) public statements of support for Taiwan's
7 democracy and its meaningful participation in inter-
8 national organizations;

9 (2) unofficial diplomatic visits to and from Tai-
10 wan by high-ranking government officials and parlia-
11 mentarians;

12 (3) the establishment of parliamentary caucuses
13 or groups that promote strong relations with Tai-
14 wan;

15 (4) strengthening subnational diplomacy, in-
16 cluding diplomatic and trade-related visits to and
17 from Taiwan by local government officials;

18 (5) strengthening coordination between United
19 States and European business chambers, univer-
20 sities, think tanks, and other civil society groups
21 with similar groups in Taiwan;

22 (6) establishing new representative, economic,
23 or cultural offices in a European country or in Tai-
24 wan;

1 (7) promoting direct flights to and from Tai-
2 wan;

3 (8) facilitating visits by religious leaders to Tai-
4 wan; and

5 (9) increasing economic engagement and trade
6 relations.

7 **SEC. 5. CONSULTATIONS WITH EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS**

8 **ON SUPPORTING TAIWAN'S SELF-DEFENSE.**

9 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

10 (1) In September 2021, the European Commis-
11 sion released the European Union Strategy for Co-
12 operation in the Indo-Pacific, which acknowledges
13 that increased tensions between the PRC and Tai-
14 wan could impact European security and economic
15 prosperity.

16 (2) In 2019, 2021, and 2023, the French Navy
17 sent warships to transit the Taiwan Strait and in
18 2021, the British Navy frigate HMS Richmond
19 transited the Taiwan Strait.

20 (3) In November 2021, the German Navy com-
21 mitted to sending vessels to the Indo-Pacific every 2
22 years to expand cooperation with like-minded states
23 advocating for freedom of navigation and a rules-
24 based international order.

1 (4) European deterrence efforts in the Taiwan
2 Strait support the United States’ strategic interests,
3 as the United States also sends warships through
4 the Taiwan Strait to promote deterrence and re-
5 spond to aggressive behavior by the PRC towards
6 Taiwan.

7 (5) In April 2023, European Commission Vice-
8 President Josep Borrell Fontelles called on Euro-
9 pean navies to patrol the Taiwan Strait to show Eu-
10 rope’s commitment to freedom of navigation.

11 (6) In August 2023, French President Emman-
12 uel Macron signed into law legislation emphasizing
13 that France would defend freedom of navigation in
14 the Indo-Pacific region, including the South China
15 Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

16 (7) European countries, including France, Ger-
17 many, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the
18 Czech Republic, and Lithuania, have developed Indo-
19 Pacific strategies.

20 (8) At the 2022 Madrid Summit, the North At-
21 lantic Treaty Organization unveiled a new Strategic
22 Concept, stating that allies will work together “to
23 address the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to
24 Euro-Atlantic security” and underscored the impor-
25 tance of the Indo-Pacific for NATO, “given that de-

1 velopments in that region can directly affect Euro-
2 Atlantic security.”.

3 (9) In September 2022, the North Atlantic
4 Council held its first dedicated discussion about the
5 status of Taiwan, its democratic government, and its
6 critical role in the manufacturing of microchips glob-
7 ally.

8 (10) In 2022, the United Kingdom approved a
9 substantial increase in exports of submarine compo-
10 nents and technology to Taiwan to upgrade its naval
11 forces.

12 (11) In 2024, Taiwan’s defense ministry signed
13 an agreement with France’s DCI Group for the sup-
14 ply of parts and accessories to maintain its Lafay-
15 ette-class frigates.

16 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
17 gress that—

18 (1) preserving peace and security in the Taiwan
19 Strait is a shared interest of the United States and
20 Europe;

21 (2) European countries, particularly countries
22 with experience combating Russian aggression and
23 malign activities, can provide Taiwan with lessons
24 learned from their “total defense” programs to mo-
25 bilize the military and civilians in a time of crisis;

1 (3) the United States and Europe should in-
2 crease coordination to strengthen Taiwan’s cyberse-
3 curity, especially for critical infrastructure and net-
4 work defense operations;

5 (4) the United States and Europe should work
6 with Taiwan—

7 (A) to improve its energy resiliency;

8 (B) to strengthen its food security;

9 (C) to combat misinformation,
10 disinformation, digital authoritarianism, and
11 foreign interference; and

12 (D) to provide expertise on how to improve
13 defense infrastructure;

14 (5) European naval powers, in coordination
15 with the United States, should increase freedom of
16 navigation transits through the Taiwan Strait; and

17 (6) European naval powers, the United States,
18 and Taiwan should establish exchanges and partner-
19 ships among their coast guards to counter coercion
20 by the PRC.

21 (c) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS.—Not later than
22 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
23 semiannually thereafter for the following 5 years the Sec-
24 retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of De-
25 fense, shall provide a briefing to the Committee on For-

1 eign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Armed
2 Services of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs
3 of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on
4 Armed Services of the House of Representatives regarding
5 discussions with governments of European NATO coun-
6 tries about contributions to Taiwan's self-defense
7 through—

8 (1) public statements of support for Taiwan's
9 security;

10 (2) arms transfers or arms sales, particularly of
11 weapons consistent with an asymmetric defense
12 strategy;

13 (3) transfers or sales of dual-use items and
14 technology;

15 (4) transfers or sales of critical nonmilitary
16 supplies, such as food and medicine;

17 (5) increasing the military presence of such
18 countries in the Indo-Pacific region;

19 (6) joint training and military exercises;

20 (7) enhancing Taiwan's critical infrastructure
21 resiliency, including communication and digital in-
22 frastructure;

23 (8) coordination to counter disinformation;

24 (9) coordination to counter offensive cyber oper-
25 ations; and

1 (10) any other matter deemed important by the
2 Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

3 **SEC. 6. EXPEDITED LICENSING FOR EUROPEAN COUN-**
4 **TRIES TRANSFERRING MILITARY EQUIPMENT**
5 **TO TAIWAN.**

6 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 90 days after the
7 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
8 shall establish an expedited decision-making process for
9 blanket third party transfers of defense articles and serv-
10 ices from NATO countries to Taiwan, including transfers
11 and re-transfers of United States origin grant, Foreign
12 Military Sales, and Direct Commercial Sales end-items not
13 covered by an exemption under the International Traffic
14 in Arms Regulations under subchapter M of chapter I of
15 title 22, Code of Federal Regulations.

16 (b) **AVAILABILITY.**—The expedited decision-making
17 process described in subsection (a)—

18 (1) shall be available for classified and unclassi-
19 fied items; and

20 (2) shall, to the extent practicable—

21 (A) require the approval, return, or denial
22 of any licensing application to export defense
23 articles and services that is related to a govern-
24 ment-to-government agreement within 15 days
25 after the submission of such application; and

1 (B) require the completion of the review of
2 all other licensing requests not later than 30
3 days after the submission of such application.